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HURDLING THE POLICE COERCION REQUIREMENT:
STATE ALTERNATIVES TO COLORADO V. CONNELLY
Ron Woodman*
If the Supreme Court insists on limiting the content of due process to rights
created by state law, state courts can breathe new life into the federal due
process clause by interpreting their common law, statutes and constitutions
to guarantee a 'property' and 'liberty' that even the federal courts must
protect.'
INTRODUCTION

Broader interpretations of state constitutional provisions and renewed attention to the totality of circumstances test2 can provide criminal defendants with
procedural safeguards that, prior to Colorado v. Connelly, one might have expected to find in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no State shall deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.' In Colorado v. Connell, the
defense challenged on due process grounds the voluntariness of a confession
given to police by a mentally ill defendant.4 The United States Supreme Court
held that coercive police conduct was necessary to find a confession involuntary5
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition, the Court held that statements made by the defendant after receiving
a Miranda warning could be admitted without violation of due process regardless
of mental health and that the preponderance of the evidence standard should be
used by the states in determining Miranda waiver. 6 To date, two states have interpreted their state constitutions to reject the reasoning of Connelly and provide
criminal defendant's broader protections. 7 Considering the experiences in these
two states, practioners representing criminal defendants should use independent
*

J.D., University of the District of Columbia School of Law, 1998.

1 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand The Protectionsof Individual Rights,90 HARV.
L. REv. 489, 503 (1977).
2 See Black's Law Dictionary1490 (6th ed. 1991). -This standard focuses on all of the circum-

stances
3
4
5
6

of a particular case, rather than any one factor." ld.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (1986).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.

7 See Hawaii v. Bowe, 881 P.2d 538, 546 (Haw. 1994) (holding that course of conduct of private
person may be sufficient to render defendant's confession involuntary): New Jersey v. Flower. 539
A.2d 1284, 1286 (NJ. Super. 1987) (adopting the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt for
Miranda waiver determinations).
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state constitutional grounds for arguing Connelly-like cases to potentially afford
their clients greater protections.
Part I of this comment will outline the development of confession law, briefly
tracing the history from Brown v. Mississippi8 to Colorado v. Connelly.9 Part II
will remind the reader of the facts and holding of the Supreme Court's decision in
Connelly. Part III will briefly present some of the leading scholarly debate surrounding the decision. Finally, in part IV, this comment will analyze a state decision that rejected Connelly on independent state grounds.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Road to Connelly: A Quick History Lesson in Confessions

In the beginning, due process challenges involving the voluntariness of confessions focused on coercive police conduct.'" As confession law evolved, courts
employed the totality of circumstances test to determine whether a confession
was voluntary." In the 1960's, coercive police conduct and mental state became
the crucial factors in voluntariness determinations.' 2 However, in 1986, the U.S.
Supreme Court traveled back in time fifty years, abandoning the totality of circumstances test to again 3require the existence of coercive police conduct to find a
confession involuntary.'
The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to involuntarily obtained confessions sixty-two
years ago in Brown v. Mississippi' 4 Defendants were beaten and tortured by
police until they confessed to a murder.' 5 The Court held that admitting into
evidence confessions obtained by torture denied the defendant his due process
rights because the government had failed to give the judge and jury an accurate
accounting of the facts.' 6 The Supreme Court has traditionally looked to the
totality of circumstances when determining the voluntariness of confessions.1 7 In
Fikes v. Alabama, the defendant was convicted of burglary with the intent to rape
8 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157.

10 See Brown v. Mississippi,297 U.S. at 285 (holding confessions obtained by police through
torture and beating involuntary).
11 See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). "The totality of the circumstances that preceded
the confession in this case goes beyond the allowable limits. The use of the confessions secured in this
setting was a denial of due process." Id. at 197.
12 See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
13 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157.
14 Brown v. Mississippi,297 U.S. 278.
15 Id. at 281-82.

16 Id. at 286.
17

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also, Fikes v, Alabama,

352 U.S. 191 (1957).
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based on his confessions. 18 Although he was not physically abused by police, the
defendant was mentally deficient, held in isolation, interrogated for long periods
of time and denied a preliminary hearing.' 9 The Court viewed the totality of the
circumstances preceding the confession before determining that the government
obtained the confession in violation of the defendant's due process rights. 0 In
light of the circumstances (prisoner of low mentality and held in isolation), the
petitioner, who could have been deemed nothing other than a person of weak will
or mind, was deprived of his due process rights when the government introduced
and the court admitted his incriminating confession. 2'
The Supreme Court revealed in subsequent cases the importance of specific
factors used in its voluntariness analysis. In Haley v. Ohio, the Court strongly
considered the age of the defendant. 22 Haley also noted the importance of evaluating psychological factors to determine the voluntariness of confessions. 3 Additionally, in Spano v. New York, the Court considered the defendant's history of
emotional instability and found that his confession, which the government obtained through an eight-hour interrogation without advice of counsel, was obtained in violation of his due process rights.24
In the 1960's, the U.S. Supreme Court shifted its focus from the totality of
circumstances to the effect of coercion on the free will of a criminal defendant. 5
A confession offered as evidence against a defendant must be a product of free
choice. 26 In Culombe v. Connecticut, the government detained and intimidated a
defendant with a mental capacity of a nine year old until he confessed, and the
Supreme Court held that the confession was not voluntary and therefore, by admitting it into evidence, the government violated the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. 2 7 In Blackburn v. Alabana, the confession at issue was obtained from an insane defendant without an attorney present during an eight- to
nine-hour interrogation in a room sometimes full of police. 28 In addition, one of
the defendant's interrogators composed the confession himself.2 9 Accordingly,
18 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191.
19 Id. at 196.
20 Id. at 197.
21 Id. at 198.
22 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
23 Id. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "But whether a confession of a lad of fifteen is 'Vol.
untary' and as such admissible, or 'coerced' and thus wanting in due process, is not a matter of mathematical determination. Essentially it invites psychological judgment-a psychological judgment that
reflects deep, even if inarticulate, feelings of our society." Id.
24 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959) (holding that a confession obtained with the
deceitful use of friend and prolonged interrogation violative of due process).
25 See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. at 208.
26 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 584 (1961).

27 Id. at 568.
28 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. at 207.
29 Id.
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the Court held that the defendant's confession was not a product of rational intellect and free will and was therefore inadmissible." Likewise, confessions obtained with the use of drugs have also been held to be inadmissible because such
31
confessions cannot be characterized as products of free will.
To determine whether a defendant voluntarily confessed, the totality of circumstances test considers various factors surrounding the confession, such as the
age, mental ability and medical condition of the defendant. 32 As it can be seen,
the totality of the circumstance test did not evolve overnight. The test has been
generally developed and widely applied through more than sixty years of case
law. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court in Connelly took a huge step back in time,
and disregarded the long enduring test of totality to narrow their focus solely on
police coercion.
I.
A.

COLORAO

. CONNELLY

The Majority

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Connelly abandoned the
totality of the circumstances test in favor of requiring coercive police conduct to
prove involuntariness. 33 In Connelly, the defendant, Francis Connelly, approached a policeman and stated that he had murdered someone and wanted to
talk about it.34 The policeman immediately advised Connelly of his Miranda
rights.3 5 Connelly stated that he understood these rights but still wanted to talk
about the murder.3 6 During the course of this initial interrogation, Connelly informed the officer that he had been a patient in several mental hospitals. 37 Upon
further interrogation, Connelly agreed to take the police to the scene of the
crime. 38 The next day, Connelly became visibly disoriented and stated that
"voices" told him to confess to the murder. 39 Initially, Connelly was incompetent
to stand trial, but, after six months of treatment, he was finally deemed compe30 Id. at 208.
31 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 307 (holding that it is difficult to imagine a situation in
which a confession would be less the product of free intellect and less voluntary than when induced by
drugs).
32 See Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 ("And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is
before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used."); Spano, 360 U.S. 323 n.3 ("medical
reports from New York City's Fordam Hospital introduced by defendant showed that he suffered a
cerebral concussion in 1955. He was described by a private physician in 1951 as 'an extremely nervous, tense individual who is emotionally unstable and maladjusted .... ..
33 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
34 Id. at 160.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 160.
39 Id. at 161.

POLICE COERCION REQUIREMENT

tent to stand trial n° At a preliminary hearing, a state doctor testified that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state the
day he confessed. 4 ' Connelly told the doctor that the "voice of God" told him to
confess to the murder or in the alternative, commit suicide.4 2 Using the reasoning set forth in Townsend v. Sain43 and Culonzbe v. Connecticut," the Colorado
trial court suppressed Connelly's statements because they were involuntary. The
Colorado trial court ruled that only confessions of a defendant's rational intellect
and free will are admissible.45
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed using the same reasoning.4 6 In addition, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the admission of involuntarily
obtained evidence in court was sufficient state action to implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 7 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
and remanded decision of Colorado Supreme Court and held that absent coercive police conduct, mental health has no bearing on the voluntariness of confession within the meaning of the due process clause.4 8
The majority in Connelly narrowly focused their analysis on the absence of
police coercion. The Court looked at the fifty years of confession cases postdating Brown v. Mississippiand found the existence of police overreaching to be
the crucial element in each case.4 9 However, the Court's position failed to appreciate the constitutional significance of free will in determining the voluntariness
50
of a confession.
The majority in Connelly also rejected a due process inquiry because they
could not find state action. 51 The Court rejected the U.S. Supreme Court of Colorado's finding that sufficient state action arose when the state allowed the de52
fendant's involuntary, insanity-compelled statement to be used as evidence.
40 1L
41

Id.

42 Id.
43 372 U.S. at 307. "Numerous decisions of this Court established the standards governing the
admissability of confessions into evidence. If an individual's 'will was overborne' or if his confession
was not 'the product of rational intellect and free will', his confession is unadmissable because it is
coerced." Id.
44 367 U.S. at 584. "And soon they too enforce it by rigorous dern and that an extra-judicial

confession, if it was to be offered into evidence against a man, must be the product of his own free
choice." Id.

45 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 162.
46 Id "[Tihe absence of police coercion or duress does not foreclose a finding of involuntariness. One's capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be overborne as much by certain

forms of severe mental illness as by external pressure." let
47 Id.
48 Id.at 170.
49 Id.
50 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 176.
51 Id.at 165.
52 Id.
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The U.S. Supreme Court, however, criticized this approach because it failed to
recognize the essential nexus between coercive activity of the State and a result53
ing confession.
B.

Justice Brennan's dissent

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan did not accept the majority's position that the mental state of a defendant had no constitutional significance in a
voluntariness case. Justice Brennan wrote that when determining whether a confession is admissible, courts should employ the age old test of voluntariness as
explained below:
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established
test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due
54
process.
Justice Brennan explained that the Supreme Court has always been concerned
with free will as an independent element in its voluntariness analysis. 55 He explained further that voluntariness determinations demand inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. 56 "The Court's failure to
recognize all forms of involuntariness or coercion as antithetical to due process
reflects a refusal to acknowledge free will as a value of constitutional consequence.",57 As Justice Brennan noted, due process gleans much of its meaning
from the concept of fundamental fairness which emphasizes the importance of
right to make critical decisions voluntarily. 58 The Fourteenth Amendment safeguards the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
"unfettered exercise of his own will". 59 Challenging the majority's premise that
53
54

Id. at 165.
Id. at 177 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. at 602).

55 See e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519,521 (1968) ("Considering the totality of these
circumstances, we do not think it credible that petitioner's statements were the product of his free and
rational choice."); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 (1967) ("Still in a 'kind of slumber' from his
last morphine injection, feverish, and in intense pain, the petitioner signed the written confessions
thus prepared for him."); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. at 583 ("[A]n extra-judicial confession, if
it was to be offered in evidence against a man, must be the product of his own free choice"); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) ("It seems obvious from the totality of this course of conduct, and
particularly the culminating threat of mob violence, that the confession was coerced and did not constitute an expression of free choice.").
56 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
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police conduct is the only relevant form of state action, Justice Brennan argued

that "[t]he due process clause requires 'that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."'6° The
fact that all the involuntary confession cases until that point had involved the
presence of coercive police conduct indicated that Connelly was a case of first
impression.6 '

H. Tim ENSUING

DEBATE

Connelly has been the source of much debate. Some commentators embrace
the majority in Connelly and agreed that absent coercive police activity, outside

compulsions do not make confessions involuntary for purposes of a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process analysis. 62 Under this analysis, a defective mental state
alone cannot justify suppression of a confession. 63 "Forces outside police misconduct may have provided compulsion which impairs a suspect's volitional abilities.
Without some degree of police overreaching, however, confessions resulting from
such compulsion are not involuntary under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause." 64 Other scholars argued that the majority misread Blackburn65 and
Townsend66 as having focused on the police conduct.6 7 The majority in Connelly
interpreted these cases to mean that the defendant's mental condition is only
relevant when connected with an individual's frailty to coercive police activity. '
Even one who agrees with the holding in Connelly
might recognize that the broad
69
implications of the case may cause unfairness.
60

Id. 479 U.S. at 180 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown %.Mississippi,297 U.S. at 286).

61

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 178.

62 E.g., Michael R. Pace, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-Defining the Protectionsof the
Fifth andFourteenthAmendments Against Self-Incriminationfor the Mentali, Impaired,78 1. Cnn.i. L
& CRmNOLOGY 877, 902 (1988).
63 Id. at 905.
64 Id.at 902.
65 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (finding involuntary the confession obtained from
the insane defendant after extended interrogation involuntary).
66 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (holding that the confession obtained from the defendant after being injected with a drug having the properties of a "truth serum" involuntary).
67 See Alfredo Garcia, Mental Sanity and Confessions: The Supreme Court'sNew Version of the
Old "Voluntariness"Standard,21 AKRON L. REv. 275 (1988); Noel Moran, Confessions Compelled By
Mental Illness: What's an Insane Person to Do? Colorado v. Connell)y 107 S.Ct 515 (1986), 56 U. CiaN.
L. REv. 1049 (1988).
68 Alfredo Garcia, supra note 67, at 280.
69 See, e.g., The Supreme Court; 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L REv. 179, 185 (1987).
"[T]he Court held that a confession is constitutionally 'involuntary' only if it was coerced by the

police, and explicitly stated 'It]he most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure
evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible.'" Id.
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IV.

STATE RESPONSES

Nine years before Connelly was decided, Justice Brennan wrote a law review
article recognizing certain U.S. Supreme Court decisions that had to one degree
or another eviscerated fights of criminal defendants.7 ° Consequently, Justice
Brennan implored state courts to interpret their state constitutions more broadly
and in a manner that would safeguard individual rights. Such interpretations allow practitioners to offer more creative arguments that ultimately result in
heightened protections for criminal defendants' constitutional rights. States can
escape the U.S. Supreme Court-created limitations like those in Connelly by in71
terpreting their own state constitutions to provide broader protection.
Recently, two states, New Jersey and Hawaii, have rejected the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Connelly.72 While Connelly prescribed the preponderance
of the evidence standard as the requisite standard of proof to determine the voluntariness of Miranda waivers, New Jersey's State Constitution required the
court in New Jersey v. Flower, to employ the more stringent beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard. While the New Jersey decision has an important effect on the
application of the Fifth Amendment, this discussion only brushes the surface of
that opinion and instead focuses on Hawaii's response to Connelly and its implication on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Hawaii broke from
Connelly's narrow reasoning that required coercive police activity before finding
a confession involuntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Hawaii v. Bowe.73 In Bowe, the U.S. Supreme Court
of Hawaii embraced Justice Brennan's Connelly dissent, and returned to the totality of circumstances test to determine the voluntariness of a confession 74 and
adopted Justice Brennan's notion of broad state agency accountability. 75 The
court in Bowe formulated a theory that circumvented the Supreme Court's police
coercion requirement. The Bowe court reasoned that the state, via its judicial
agents, i.e., prosecutors and courts, can "participate" in a due process violation. 76
In New Jersey v. Flower, the defendant's confessions were held inadmissible
because his infantile mental capabilities precluded him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights. 77 Although Connelly required states to deter-

mine the voluntariness of Miranda waiver by only a preponderance of the
evidence, the court in Flower, via their state constitution, mandated the more
70 See Brennan, supra note 1.
71 Id.at 503.
72 See Hawaii v. Bowe, 881 P.2d 538, 546 (Haw. 1994); New Jersey v. Flower, 539 A.2d 1284,
1286 (N.J. Super. 1987).
73 Bowe, 881 P.2d at 547.
74 Id.
75 See id.; Connelly, 479 U.S. at 178-80.
76 Bowe, 881 P.2d at 546.
77 New Jersey v. Flower, 539 A.2d at 1287.
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stringent beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.7 8 The New Jersey court held that
states were entitled to expand the rights of criminal defendants beyond those
granted by the U.S. Constitution and recognized the importance of protecting the
constitutional rights of individuals.79
In Hawaii v. Bowe, the defendant's confession to an assault was held inadmis-

sible due to the coercive influence of his basketball coach.8° The defendant's
coach urged him to meet with police and to give an inculpatory statement without

benefit of counsel. 8' The defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement and
argued that the statement was the result of undue influence by his coach. Persuaded, the circuit court granted the motion and the State appealed.'
78 Id. at 1286.
79 Id. at 1286. "It is 'an established principle of our federalist system' that states may afford
'individual liberties more expansive than those afforded by the federal constitution.'" Id at 1286-87
(quoting State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (1987)). "What is at stake is ensuring the use of effective
procedural safeguards to secure the right of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
that 'no person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. . .'" Id.
80 Bowe, 881 P.2d at 547.
81 I1&
82 Id. In determining that Defendant's statement was coerced, the circuit court entered the
following [findings of fact]:
1. In or about January or February of 1990, Sergeant John Pinero ...was an employee of
the [Hawaii Police Department, (HPD)], who was at that time working on an investigation of an assault which allegedly involved Defendant TROY BOWE.
2. In his capacity as a police officer with the [HPD], Sergeant Pinero called Riley Wallace
....at that time basketball coach of the University of Hawaii at Manoa Basketball Team
....and gave Wallace a list of suspects who were on the Basketball Team that Sergeant
Pinero wanted Wallace to bring down to the [HPD] (hereinafter -List").
3. Wallace, as head basketball coach, had the authority to suspend athletes or remove them
from the Basketball Team and, in the case of scholarship-athletes, to initiate procedures
to withdraw their athletic-scholarship.
4. Defendant TROY BOWE was a scholarship-athlete on the Basketball Team.
5. Defendant TROY BOWE was on said List.
6. Sergeant Pinero specifically asked Wallace to locate the individuals on the List and have
them meet with Sergeant Pinero.
7. Sergeant Pinero, however, did not request that Wallace use force or coercion while attempting to have individuals on the List meet with Sergeant Pinero.
8. Wallace then contacted Defendant TROY BOWE and informed him that he had to go
down to the [HPD] to meet with Sergeant Pinero.
9. Wallace informed Defendant TROY BOWE that Wallace would accompany him to the
[HPD] in place of an attorney and instructed Defendant TROY BOWE to make a statement to Sergeant Pinero.
10. Wallace did not inform Defendant TROY BOWE that he could or should have an attorney present with him when he went to be interviewed by Sergeant Pinero.
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In Bowe, the court stated that the Due Process Clause of the Hawaii Constitution was fashioned after the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but
that the due process protection of the state constitution was not limited to the
protections afforded under the U.S. Constitution.83 Although the court in Bowe
recognized that the touchstone of due process is to protect individuals against
arbitrary government action, the court also stated that the Due Process clause
served to "protect the right of the accused in a criminal case to a fundamentally
fair trial." 84 Articulating a position similar to Justice Brennan's, the Bowe court
stated that the right to make a meaningful choice between confessing and remaining silent is "[i]mplicit in a fundamentally fair trial.",85 As a result, the Bowe
court interpreted their state constitution in a manner consistent with this notion.
The Bowe court refused to accept the position that coercive police activity was
a necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary. Instead, the court
chose to approach a Connelly-type situation more broadly and tested the voluntariness of a confession in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the
confession, regardless of coercive police conduct.86 Consistent with earlier U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, Bowe recognized that the choice to confess or remain
silent can be influenced by sources other than coercive police conduct. 17 Therefore, by presenting an argument based on a state constitutional principle that
calls for a more liberal interpretation than the U.S. Constitution, an advocate
could sway a court to expand a defendant's rights when faced with problematic
circumstances, such as confessions compelled by mental disease. 8
Bowe held that the absence of police coercion did not preclude the finding of
state action for due process violation purposes. Boldly and practically applying
Justice Brennan's notion of broader state agency accountability, Bowe formulated a novel theory that recognized state action absent police coercion. Bringing
11. Defendant TROY BOWE believed that he could not refuse to follow Wallace's directions because if he did so Wallace could suspend him form the Basketball Team or institute procedures to revoke Defendant TROY BOWE's athletic-scholarship.
Id.
83 See Bowe, 881 P.2d at 544. "When the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a
provision present in both the United States and Hawaii Constitutions does not adequately preserve
the rights and interests sought to be protected, we will not hesitate to recognize the appropriate
protections as a matter of state constitutional law." Id. (quoting Hawaii v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150, 154
(Haw. 1994)).
84 Id. at 546.
85 Id. (recognizing the importance of unrestrained choice in the absence of coercive police
conduct).
86 Id. at 547.
87 See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. at 521. "Considering the totality of these circumstances, we do not think it credible that petitioner's statements were the product of his free and
rational choice." Id.
88 Hawaii achieved this result with broader interpretation of Article 1 sections 5 and 10 of their

state constitution. Although this argument may work for states with state constitutions, for the District of Columbia, broader rights via legislation may be the only alternative.
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this notion to life with the court and the prosecutor acting as the state's agents,
the court in Bowe found that the state (principal) "participated" in the violation
when the prosecutor (agent) proffered the involuntary statements into evidence
and the court (agent) allowed the involuntary statements to be admitted into
evidence. 89 Due to this increased realm of state accountability, criminal defendants may find under their own state constitutions heightened procedural safeguards and constitutional protections.
V.

CONCLUSION

By turning to its own state constitution, returning to the totality of the circumstances test to measure the voluntariness of confessions, and by broadening the
due process accountability of state agents, Hawaii escaped the narrow rule in
Connelly. In similar fashion, New Jersey raised the State's burden of proof when
determining the voluntariness of Miranda waivers. In Connelly, the Court created a per se rule that requires police coercion as a necessary predicate to the
finding of involuntariness within the Constitution.9' The U.S. Supreme Court
supported this new rule by pointing to the existence of coercive police conduct in
the fifty years of cases post-dating Brown v. Mississippi.9 1 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court had for years considered other factors in making voluntariness
decisions. 92 In response to Connelly, Hawaii has taken bold steps to safeguard
the state constitutional rights of the accused. To insure that a defendant's right to
remain silent is adequately protected, Hawaii broadly interpreted its state constitution and resolved the voluntariness issues with consideration to the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. 93 In addition, Hawaii
formulated a state-participation theory based upon a broad-agency type relationship. Hawaii has taken the stance that a return to the totality of the circumstances
and broader state agency accountability will ensure all people the fundamental
fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Learning from the states' experience, practioners can tackle Connelly-type situations using their state constitutions to increase protections for criminal defendants. At a minimum, criminal defense attorneys might persuade a court to require
a heightened standard of proof when confronted with the Fifth Amendment
prong of Connelly. Likewise, though arguably more difficult, practioners might
argue that their state constitutions require a court to consider the totality of cir89
90

Bowe, 881 P.2d at 546.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163.

91 Id
92 See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (considering the age of defendant); Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191 (1957) (considering the totality of circumstances), Spano r. Ness, York, 360 U.S. 315 (considering defendant's history of emotional instability); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (considering

the mental state of defendant).
93

Bowe 881 P.2d at 547.
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cumstances when determining voluntariness of waiver. Furthermore, and perhaps the most novel path around the U.S. Supreme Court's restrictive per se rule,
is the agency notion that finds state participation in a due process violation where
not a police officer coerces the defendant, but a private party coerces, the state
proffers, and a court admits that confession into evidence. At best, the criminal
defense attorney has three potentially powerful and effective arguments that can
renew their clients' otherwise-eviscerated rights.

